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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 78-2(A)(3)(i) of the 
Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion or 
committed manifest injustice in refusing to order that the increase 
in child support be retroactive prior to October 15, 1991 despite 
the fact that prior to October 15, 1991 there was no substantial 
change in circumstances as defined by the Uniform Civil Liability 
for Support Act. 
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion or 
committed manifest injustice in failing to modify the Decree of 
Divorce so as to switch the dependency exemption for the parties' 
minor child from the Appellee to the Appellant when based on the 
stipulated facts there was no change in the circumstances upon 
which the Decree of Divorce was based. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
As all of the evidence was presented to the court by way of 
stipulation, the standard of review is whether the lower court 
abused its discretion or committed manifest injustice. Fullmer v. 
Fullmer, 761 P.2d 942 (Utah App. 1988), Kramer v. Kramer, 738 P.2d 
624 (Utah 1987). 
1 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The statutory provisions determinative in this action are: 
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5(3) (1953 as amended). 
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent 
changes or new orders for the support and maintenance of 
the parties, the custody of the children and their 
support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the 
distribution of property as is reasonable and necessary. 
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-10.6(2) (1953 as amended). 
A child or spousal support payment under a child support 
order may be modified with respect to any period during 
which a petition for modification is pending, but only 
from the date notice of that is the petitioner, or to the 
obligor, if the obligee is the petitioner. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.2(6) 
With regard to child support orders, enactment of the 
guidelines and any subsequent change in the guidelines 
constitutes a substantial or material change of circumstances 
as a ground for modification of a court order, if there is a 
difference of at least 25% between the existing order and the 
guidelines... 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.2(2)(a) and (b) 
The child support guidelines shall be applied as a rebuttable 
presumption in establishing or modifying the amount of 
temporary or permanent child support. 
The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and 
considerations required by the guidelines and the award 
amounts resulting from the application of the guidelines are 
presumed to be correct, unless rebutted under the provisions 
of this section. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.2(3) 
A written finding or specific finding on the record supporting 
the conclusion that complying with a provision of the 
guidelines or ordering an award amount resulting from use of 
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the guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, or not in the 
best interest of a child in a particular case is sufficient to 
rebut the presumption in that case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Mature of the Case. 
This appeal requests a review of the lower court's ruling on 
the Appellant's Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce and 
Amended Petition to Modify. 
II. Course of Proceedings. 
On or about April 22, 1991 the Appellee was served with the 
Appellant's Petition to Modify Decree. On or about May 19, 1992 
the Appellant served her Supplemental Petition to Modify. On 
September 3, 1992 Appellant's Petition to Modify and Supplemental 
Petition came on for trial. At the trial, the parties stipulated 
to all but two (2) issues. The stipulated issues included an 
increase in the appellee's monthly child support obligation from 
$250.00 to $322.00. The two issues that were submitted to the 
court were (1) the date to which the increase in child support 
should be retroactively applied, and (2) whether the Decree of 
Divorce should be modified so as to transfer the dependency 
exemption for the parties' minor child from the Appellee to the 
Appellant. Evidence on these issues was submitted by proffer. The 
parties stipulated to the truth and correctness of the proffered 
facts. Based on the stipulated facts, the court ordered that the 
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Appellee's increase in child support should be retroactive to 
October 15, 1991, and that there was not a substantial change in 
circumstances upon which to modify the Decree of Divorce so as to 
switch the dependency exemption from the Appellee to the Appellant. 
III. Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for 
Review. 
On April 22, 1991 the Appellant served the Appellee with her 
Petition to Modify. The Petition requested (a) that the Decree of 
Divorce be modified to increase the Appellant's child support 
obligation in an amount consistent with the Child Support 
Guidelines, and (2) that the Appellant obtain life insurance on his 
life in the sum of at least $100,000 with the parties' minor child 
named as the beneficiary and the Appellant as the Trustee. 
In support of the Petition to Modify, the Appellant alleged 
three (3) changes in circumstances: (a) that the Appellee had moved 
to New York; (b) that the Appellee's earnings had substantially 
increased; and (c) that the cost of raising the parties' minor 
child had substantially increased. 
On May 19, 1992 the Appellant served the Appellee with the 
Supplemental Petition to Modify. The Supplemental Petition to 
Modify requested that the Decree of Divorce be modified so as to 
switch the tax dependency exemption for the parties' minor child 
from the Appellee to the Appellant. The Supplemental Petition to 
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Modify d i d n o t s t a t e what s u b s t a n t i a l change in c i r c u m s t a n c e s would 
s u p p o i i su i 11 1 mod i f i ca t inn 
On September I I * I lit A p p e l l a n t I ' u l i l i u n I Illlli MI I I \ i time 
on for h e a r i n q In I mi III i MMMI J u d i c i a l Hi s t r i c t u ill III ^ 
I I nn in ii in rit lLiI ii fi'ii mi I l l ' II in in l i in | i i t M l i i i i i i i ' i l I II II i n 11 1 1"h * ) i fti I l e s 
were a b l e I 11 s t i p u l a t e i n t h e s e t t l e m e n t oi s e v e r a l i s s u e s # 
i n c l u d i n g an i n c r e a s e ^ *-he A p p e l l e e ' s c h i l d suppor t nli l i g a t i o n 
(Preamble' lu I'ununilt'iI inn) nl I I n I ' n " I iL-I IIIII I I I n r 
A d d e n d u m A I . 
The remain i iric) issues that were submitted to the court were the 
date to which the increase 1 support would be retioauti 
The Appellant requested that the increase be retroactively applied 
1 « M ' • i,,/ A | | i' i I. ."' i " " ' ' 'nil,- " -g 
issue was whether the Decree ol Divorce should be modified su as to 
transfer the dependency exemption for the parties* minor child from 
1: IImi • h y p e I l e t I  Il In ^ p p e l I i-nil . 
The parties produced evidence by way or proffer, The parties 
stipulated lint the1 proffered facts were true and correct (Findings 
ot I•'mrt *iinrl cnnrhni nnn nt I iu I»aroqrajih i ui, l\ddr1111111m IJ I . 
The proffered facti I Ii iI w n e stipulated tu as I rue and 
correct i m I in I oil; 
I a | the circumstances of the parties that existed at the 
time of the Decree of Divorce, to-wit, that at the Lime of the 
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Decree the Appellee was a full-time college student and the 
Appellant was working full-time (Paragraph 1, Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, Addendum B); 
(b) that the Decree of Divorce provided that from 1986 
through 1989 the Appellant would claim the dependency exemption for 
the parties' minor child, and that from 1990 on the Appellee would 
claim the minor child as a dependency exemption (Paragraph 6, 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law); 
(c) that the circumstances upon which the court granted 
the dependency exemption to the Appellant through 1989 and to the 
Appellee from 1990 forward were that at the time of the Decree the 
Appellee was a full-time college student, that at the time of the 
Decree the Appellant was working full-time, that at the time of the 
Decree of Divorce the parties anticipated that in 1990 the Appellee 
would have obtained employment and would be earning more than the 
Appellant and would have greater use for the dependency exemption 
(Paragraphs 1, 2 and 6, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law); 
(d) the gross monthly incomes of the Appellant and the 
Appellee as of April 22, 1991, the date Appellant was served with 
the Petition to Modify (Paragraph 9, Findings of Fact); 
(e) that the Guideline amount that existed on the date 
the Appellee was served with the Petition to Modify (April 22, 
1991) was $295.00 (Paragraph 10, Findings of Fact); 
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(f) that the Guideline amount that existed on April 22, 
1991 of 'J?1*1! uiin per month was 1 ess than a 25% d ifference between 
the e x i s 111 i \ i . .upp< ::>i I Il: $ 2 5 C C 3 I , 
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reconsider and increase child support" (Paragraph 13, Findings of 
Fact). 
On the issue of retroactivity, the court concluded: 
(a) that the increase in child support should be 
retroactive to October 15, 1991, as of that date there was greater 
than a 25% difference between the Guideline amount and the then-
existing order (Paragraphs 3 and 5, Conclusions of Law); 
(b) that the increase in child support should not be 
retroactive to April 22, 1991, as of that date there was not a 25% 
difference between the existing order and the Guideline amount 
(Paragraph 5, Conclusions of Law); 
On the tax dependency exemption issue, the court concluded 
that 
"there has not been a substantial change in circumstances 
of the parties sufficient to warrant altering the portion 
of the existing Decree which awards the plaintiff the 
right to claim the minor child of the parties as a 
dependent and thus claim an exemption for income tax 
purposes." (Paragraph 8, Conclusions of Law). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Appellant raises two (2) issues in her brief. These 
issues are (1) that the lower court erred in ordering that the 
Appellee's increase in child support should be retroactive to 
October 15, 1991 as opposed to April 22, 1991; and (2) that the 
lower court erred in not modifying the Decree of Divorce so as to 
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switch the tax dependency exemption for the parties' minor child 
from the Appellee to the Appellant. 
On the retroactivity issue, the Appellant makes three (3) 
points. The first point is that the trial court did not make 
adequate findings to support its conclusion that the increase would 
not be retroactive to April 22, 1991, as of that date there was not 
a substantial change in circumstance. The Appellee argues that a 
Decree of Divorce can only be modified when there is a substantial 
change in circumstances. According to the Uniform Civil Liability 
for Support Act, a change in circumstance exists so as to modify 
child support when there is a difference of at least 25% between 
the existing order and the Guideline amount. The trial court 
concluded that the order would not be retroactive to April 22, 
1991, as of that date there was not a 25% difference between the 
Guideline amount and the existing order. The trial court ordered 
that the modification be retroactive to October 15, 1991, as of 
that date there was at least a 25% difference between the Guideline 
amount and the existing order. The Appellant's assertions aside, 
the court's conclusion was amply supported by findings which 
detailed the parties' incomes as of both April 22, 1991 and October 
15, 1991, the Guideline amounts that existed on those dates as well 
as the fact that on April 22, 1991 there was less than a 25% 
difference between the existing order and Guideline amount, and the 
9 
fact that on October 15, 1991 there was at least a 25% difference 
between the Guideline amount and the existing order. 
The Appellant argues that despite the fact that on April 22, 
1991 there was less than a 25% difference between the Guideline 
amount and the existing order, the court had the authority to make 
the order retroactive to April 22, 1991. The presumption of the 
Uniform Civil Liability Act, that a change in circumstance exists 
when there is at least a 25% difference between the existing order 
and the Guideline amount, may be rebutted when the court determines 
that applying the Guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate or not 
in the child's best interest. As the Appellant introduced 
absolutely no evidence to rebut the Guideline's presumption of 
correctness, the Appellant cannot now claim that the court erred in 
failing to divert from the Guidelines. 
The Appellant also claims that the stipulated facts that the 
Appellant's salary decreased, the Appellee's salary increased, and 
that the cost of caring for Alison increased, the court should have 
made the order retroactive to April 22, 1991. These facts are not 
sufficient to rebut the Guideline's presumption of correctness. 
The increases and decreases in the parties' incomes are what 
established the existence of a substantial change in circumstances 
as of October 15, 1991. These same facts indicated no substantial 
change in circumstances as of April 22, 1991. As the parties' 
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salaries did not create a change in circumstance on April 22, 1991, 
it could hardly be argued that these same factors rebut the 
Guideline's presumption of correctness. The fact that costs for 
caring for Alison may have increased does not by itself, without 
any evidence as to the extent of these increases, rebut the 
Guideline's presumption of correctness. 
The second issue raised by the appeal is whether the court 
erred in failing to find that no change in circumstance existed 
upon which to modify the Decree of Divorce so as to switch the 
dependency exemption from the Appellee to the Appellant. 
As the circumstances upon which the Decree of Divorce awarded 
the Appellant the dependency exemption through tax year 1989 and 
then to the Appellee from 1990 forward were that from the date of 
the Decree through 1989 it was anticipated that the Appellant would 
earning more than the Appellee, and that from 1990 forward, the 
Appellee would be earning more than the Appellant, and as there has 
been no change in those circumstances, the court was correct in 
finding that there was no change in circumstances sufficient to 
modify the Decree of Divorce so as to switch the tax dependency 
exemption from the Appellee to the Appellant. 
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ARGUMENT 
I* The Lower Court Properly Ruled That the Increase in Child 
Support Should Be Retroactive to the Date There Was At Least 
a 25% Difference Between the Guideline Amount and the Then-
Existing Order. 
The Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce was served on the 
Appellee on April 22, 1991. On that date, there was less than a 
25% difference between the existing order and the Guideline amount. 
On October 15, 1991 the Appellee received a raise. As of October 
15, 1991, there was more than a 25% difference between the existing 
order and Guideline amount. At trial, the Appellee argued that the 
increase in child support should be retroactive to October 15, 
1991. The Appellant argued that the increase should be retroactive 
to the date the Appellee was served with the Petition to Modify, 
April 22, 1991. The court ruled that the increase would be 
retroactive to October 15, 1991. In her brief, the Appellant 
claims that: 
(1) The court failed to make adequate findings; 
(2) The court had the authority to make the increase 
retroactive to April 22, 1991 (even though as of that date there 
was not a difference of at least 25% between the existing order and 
the Guideline amount); and 
(3) Based on the stipulated facts, the court should have 
made the increase retroactive to April 22, 1991. 
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A. The Trial Court Made Adequate Findings for Its 
Decision That the Increase in Child Support Should Be 
Retroactive Only to the Date When There Was a 25% Difference 
Between the Existing Order and Guideline Amount. 
The Appellant cites Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 
1990) for the proposition that when modifying child support, the 
trial court must make specific findings on all the statutory 
factors, including the needs of the child and the parents' ability 
to pay. The Appellant fails to realize that although Ostler was 
decided in 1990, the Court based its decision on pre-Child Support 
Guideline law. Since the adoption of the Guidelines, the courts do 
not need to consider the factors set forth in Ostler, including: 
"the standard of living and situations of the 
parties...the relative wealth and income of 
the parties...the ability of the obligor to 
earn..." Id. at 715. 
As Ostler was decided on pre-Guideline law, in the instant 
case it was not necessary that the trial court make findings on the 
factors set forth in Ostler. 
As the Appellant claims that the trial court did not made 
adequate findings to support its conclusions, it is first necessary 
to review the trial court's conclusions. In paragraph 3 of the 
Conclusions of Law, the court concluded that as of October 15, 1991 
there was a 25% increase between the existing order and the 
Guideline amount, the plaintiff's child support should be 
increased: 
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"Under the statutory guidelines based upon the 
parties7 current incomes and incomes as of 
October 15, 1991, plaintiff's child support 
obligation has increased by more than twenty-
five percent (25%) over his obligation 
provided in the existing order. Pursuant to 
Ut. Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2(6) (1953 as amended) 
in light of that twenty-five percent (25%) 
increase, the plaintiff's child support 
obligation should be increased to the sum of 
three hundred twenty-two dollars ($322.00) per 
month." Conclusions of Law, p. 7. 
In paragraph 5 of the Conclusions of Law, the court concluded 
that as the plaintiff's increase in gross monthly salary to 
$3,081.00 (the amount that made a greater than 25% difference 
between the Guidelines and the existing order) occurred on October 
15, 1991, the order should be retroactive to that date: 
"Because the increase in plaintiff's salary to 
three thousand eighty-one dollars ($3,081.00) 
gross per month occurred on October 15, 1991, 
the increase in plaintiff's child support 
obligation should be retroactive, pursuant to 
Ut. Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6 (2) (1953 as 
amended), only to October 15, 1991. 
Conclusions of Law, p. 8. 
In paragraph 6, the court concluded that as of April 22, 1991 
there was not a 25% difference between the existing order and the 
Guideline amount, the increase in child support should not be 
retroactive to April 22, 1991, but only to October 15, 1991: 
"The child support shall not be retroactive to 
when the plaintiff was served with the 
Petition for Modification (April 22, 1991) 
because as of that date based upon the 
parties' respective incomes at that time the 
increase in child support under the guidelines 
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was less than one hundred twenty-five percent 
(<125%) of plaintiffs support obligation 
under the existing order." Conclusions of 
Law, paragraph 6. 
Pared to the bare essentials, the three (3) cited provisions 
of the Conclusions of Law are that as of October 15, 1991, as there 
was a 25% difference between the existing order the Guideline 
amount, the increase in child support would be retroactive to that 
date. As there was not a 25% difference between the existing order 
and the Guideline amount until October 15, 1991, the increase in 
child support would not be retroactive prior to October 15, 1991. 
According to the decision in Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 
199 (Utah App. 1987) the above conclusions are adequately supported 
when the findings: 
"(1) are sufficiently detailed, (2) include 
enough facts to disclose the process through 
which the ultimate conclusion is reached, (3) 
indicate the process is logical and properly 
supported, and (4) are not clearly erroneous." 
Id. at 203. 
Applying the Marchant decision to the instant case, the trial 
court's conclusion that the increase in child support would not be 
retroactive prior to October 15 ,1991 as prior to that date there 
was less than a 25% difference between the existing order and the 
guideline amount, the findings in the instant case are sufficient 
if they set forth the gross monthly incomes of the parties as of 
October 15, 1991 and as of April 22, 1991, a computation of 
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Guideline amounts as of those dates, and whether there was a 25% 
difference between the existing order and the Guideline amount. 
The Findings of Fact in the instant case contain this information 
and more. The Findings that touch on the issue of retroactivity 
are paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of the Findings of Fact. Paragraph 9 
sets forth the parties' gross monthly incomes as of April of 1991: 
"In April, 1991 plaintiff was earning only two 
thousand eight hundred fifty-two dollars 
($2,852.00) gross monthly salary working for 
IBM. In April, 1991 defendant was earning one 
thousand eight hundred seventy-three dollars 
$1,873.00) gross per month working full-time 
as a school teacher." Findings of Fact, p. 4. 
Paragraph 10 states that the income as of April 22, 1991 did 
not constitute a 25% difference between the existing order and 
amount under the Guidelines: 
"Under the statutory support guidelines, in 
April, 1991, plaintiff's child support 
obligation to the defendant, if then re-
calculated, would have been two hundred 
ninety-five dollars ($295.00) per month. Said 
sum represents less than a twenty-five percent 
(25%) increase in plaintiff's support 
obligation under the guidelines from the 
existing court order ($250.00) in effect in 
April 1991." Findings of Fact, p. 4. 
Paragraph 11 recites the Appellee's raise to $3,081.00 per 
month: 
"On or about October 15, 1991, the plaintiff 
received an increase in his monthly gross 
income and since that date has been earning 
three thousand eighty-one dollars ($3,081.00) 
gross per month. Findings of Fact, p. 4. 
16 
As these Findings completely set forth the parties' incomes as 
of April and October of 1991, as they state that there was not a 
25% difference between the existing order and the Guideline amount 
as of April of 1991, and as they set forth the plaintiff's increase 
of income of October of 1991, the Findings sufficiently detail and 
disclose the process through which the court concluded that the 
increase should be retroactive to October of 1991. As is required 
by Marchant. that process is logical, properly supported, and not 
erroneous. Quite simply, the court made the increase retroactive 
to the date on which there was a 25% difference between the 
existing order and the Guideline amount, and no further. 
B. The Appellant Failed to Produce Any Evidence To 
Overcome the Guidelines' Rebuttable Presumption of 
Correctness. 
In Point 1(b) of her Brief, the Appellant argues that although 
a 25% difference between the existing order and the new Guideline 
amount may be a sufficient basis to modify a support order, a 25% 
difference is not necessary for a modification. The Appellant then 
goes on to state that: 
"A trial court can modify an existing order 
when it finds a material change of 
circumstances independent of the impact of the 
Guidelines.M 
In a way, the Appellant is correct. A court can modify a 
support order even if there is less than a 25% difference between 
the existing order and the Guideline amount. It is also true that 
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"a decree can only be modified when there is a substantial change 
in circumstances upon which the order is based." Haslam v. Haslam, 
657 P.2d 757. 
As is stated in § 78-45-7.3, Utah Code Annotated, a 
substantial and/or material change in circumstance exists 
sufficient to modify child support where there is "a difference of 
at least 25% between the existing order and the guidelines." The 
25% level is not an absolute. § 78-45-7.2(a) states that "...the 
guidelines should be applied as a rebuttable presumption 
in...modifying the amount of...permanent child support." 
Section 78-45-7.2(3) requires that when a court deviates from 
the Guidelines, the court must provide specific findings why the 
court reached: 
"the conclusion that complying with a 
provision of the guidelines or ordering an 
award amount resulting from use of the 
guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, or 
not in the best interest of a child in a 
particular case is sufficient to rebut the 
presumption in that case." 
It follows that for a court to deviate from the Guidelines, 
there must have been sufficient evidence that applying the 
Guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate or not in the child's 
best interest. Other than the conclusory statement of Paragraph 4 
of the Findings of Fact that the cost of caring for the child has 
increased, the Appellant produced absolutely no evidence whatsoever 
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upon which the trial court could conclude that applying the 
Guidelines and making the order retroactive to October of 1991 was 
somehow unjust, inappropriate, or did not follow the best interest 
of the child. 
In Christensen v. Christensen the Court stated: 
"The burden rests with the party seeking 
modification to show a substantial change in 
circumstances such as to warrant 
modification." Christensen v. Christensen. 
628 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1981). 
The Appellant, having failed to produce any evidence (the 
Appellant did not even attempt to introduce any such evidence) to 
rebut the Guideline's presumption of correctness, the Appellant 
cannot now claim that the trial court erred in failing to divert 
from the Guidelines and make child support retroactive to April 22, 
1991. 
C The Stipulated Facts Do Not Indicate That the Increase in 
Child Support Should Be Retroactive to April of 1991. 
The Appellant's third subpoint is that the stipulated facts 
"indicate" that the increase in child support should be retroactive 
to April 22, 1991. 
The Appellant claims that three factors "unrelated to the 
impact of the Guidelines were sufficient to establish a change in 
circumstances." The Appellant identifies these three factors as 
"(1) a large increase in Mr. Blaine's salary, 
(2) a decrease in Ms. Bradshaw's salary, and 
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(3) an increase in the cost of caring for 
Alison." Appellant Brief at 21. 
The Appellant fails to realize, as has been set forth above, 
that however large the Appellant and Appellee's respective 
increases and/or decreases in gross monthly incomes may have been, 
there is no substantial change in circumstances unless there is 
greater than a 25% difference between the existing order and the 
Guideline amount. As on April 22, 1991 the difference between the 
existing order and the Guideline amount was less than 25%, a 
substantial change in circumstances upon which to make the increase 
in child support retroactive did not exist on that date. 
The third stipulated fact that the Appellant claims 
"indicated" that the increase in child support should have been 
retroactive to April 22, 1991 was "an increase in the cost of 
caring for Alison." In accordance with Uniform Civil Liability for 
Support Act, the requirement of a 25% difference between the 
Guideline amount and the existing order is a rebuttable presumption 
of a change in circumstances. The presumption may be rebutted by 
evidence that convinces the court that applying the Guidelines 
would be unfair, unjust or not in the child's best interest. The 
parties did stipulate, as is set forth in Paragraph 4 of the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that the cost of caring for 
"a nine year old child today is greater than for caring for a three 
year old child six years ago." 
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The Appellant introduced absolutely no evidence as to the 
increase in caring for Alison. The Appellant made absolutely no 
attempt to demonstrate what her costs were in 1987. The Appellant 
made no effort to demonstrate the extent to which these costs had 
increased. The Appellant made absolutely no attempt to introduce 
evidence of any new costs. The Appellant failed to produce any 
evidence as to increases in her own debts and living expenses. 
This evidence would have had a bearing on whether the Appellant had 
less (or perhaps more) money available to provide for the minor 
child. 
It may or may not be that if the Appellant had produced 
evidence that supported her contention that the cost of caring for 
the parties' minor child had increased, such evidence would have 
been sufficient to rebut the presumption that a material change in 
circumstance exists where there is a 25% difference between the 
existing order and the Guideline amount. What is certain is that 
the Appellant cannot claim that the trial court erred in failing to 
make the increase in child support retroactive to April of 1991 
when the Appellant made absolutely no effort to introduce any 
evidence to rebut the presumption and show that the application of 
the Guidelines would be unfair, unjust and/or not in the child's 
best interest. 
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II. The Trial Court Properly Found That There Was No Substantial 
Change In Circumstances To Modify The Decree of Divorce So As 
To Switch The Dependency Deduction From The Appellee To The 
Appellant. 
As is set forth in Paragraph 1, 2, 3, 6 and 9 of the Findings 
of Fact, when the parties were divorced in 1986, the Appellee was 
a college student. The Appellant was working full time. At the 
time the Decree was entered, the parties anticipated that in 1990 
the Appellee would have graduated from college and would be earning 
more than the Appellant, and would have greater use for the 
dependency exemption. Based on the circumstance that from 1986 
through tax year 1989 the Appellant would be earning more than the 
Appellee, and that from 1990 forward the Appellee would be earning 
more than the Appellant, and would have a greater use for the 
dependency exemption, the Appellant was awarded the exemption 
through 1989, after which the Appellee was awarded the parties' 
minor child as a dependency exemption. 
On or about May 19, 1992, the Appellant filed her Amended 
Petition to Modify. In the Amended Petition to Modify, the 
Appellant requested that she be awarded the dependency exemption. 
It is not clear from the Amended Petition what substantial changes 
in circumstance the Appellant relied upon in requesting that the 
dependency exemption be transferred from the Appellee to the 
Appellant. At the hearing on September 3, 1992, the lower court 
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made its findings based upon the parties' stipulation. Based on 
those findings, the court concluded that: 
"There has not been a substantial change in 
circumstances of the parties sufficient to 
warrant altering the portion of the existing 
decree which awards to plaintiff the right to 
claim the minor child of the parties as a 
dependent and thus claim an exemption for 
income tax purposes." Conclusions of Law, p. 
9. 
The Appellant claims that the court erred in refusing to 
modify the Decree of Divorce so as to transfer the dependency 
exemption from the Appellee to the Appellant. The Appellant's 
supporting argument is fraught with factual and legal errors. 
These errors will be addressed in the order of their appearance in 
the Appellant's brief. 
On page 23, the Appellant states: 
"Because the trial court recalculated the 
parties' child support obligations in light of 
changed circumstances, its subsequent decision 
must either conform to the guidelines or be 
justified by adequate findings. However, the 
trial court departed from the guidelines 
without justifying the departure." 
This statement embodies a number of errors. First, the 
Appellant seems to be suggesting that the change in circumstances 
that supported the modification to increase the child support would 
also support a modification to switch the dependency exemption from 
the Appellant to the Appellee. This suggestion is contrary to the 
23 
decision in Haslam v, Haslam, 657 P.2d 757 (Utah 1982) where the 
Court stated: 
"The change in circumstances required to 
justify a modification of a divorce decree 
varies with the type of modification sought." 
Id. at 758. 
Unless the circumstances upon which the award of child support 
and the dependency exemption were the same, a substantial change in 
circumstances upon which a child support award is based would not 
serve as a substantial change upon which to base a modification of 
the dependency exemption. In the instant case, the change of 
circumstances upon which the modification to increase child support 
was based was an increase in the Appellee's income. As the 
circumstance upon which the award of the dependency exemption was 
based was that the party with the greater income should receive the 
dependency exemption, an increase in the Appellee's income would 
not be a substantial change of circumstances upon which to modify 
the dependency exemption. 
The Appellant's second error (and an error that is repeated on 
numerous occasions throughout the Appellant's brief) is that the 
court did not make adequate findings as to why its decision did not 
conform to the Guidelines. The Appellant seems to be suggesting 
that the court's decision whether or not to modify the tax 
dependency exemption must be done in accordance with the Child 
Support Guidelines. The Appellant ignores the long-standing 
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holdings too numerous to count that stand for the unwavering 
standard that a decree is to be modified when there is a 
substantial change in circumstances upon which the award is based. 
As there has been no change in the circumstances upon which the 
divorce court awarded the tax dependency exemption, the Child 
Support Guidelines do not bear on the issue of the tax dependency 
exemption. 
The third error is the Appellant's complaint as to the court's 
lack of findings. As has been set forth above, the findings 
carefully detailed the parties7 circumstances that existed at the 
time of the Decree of Divorce, what the parties anticipated what 
would happen in 1990, the reason why the dependency exemption was 
switched from the Appellant to the Appellee after tax year 1989, 
and the parties' present circumstances. Should this Court disagree 
with the Appellee and agree with the Appellant and determine that 
the trial court did not make adequate findings, the holding in 
Howard v. Howard, 601 P.2d 931 (Utah 1979), makes clear that the 
Appellant cannot blame the court for omitting any findings of fact 
which the Appellant believes the court should have made: 
"When, however, a party drafts findings which 
are adopted by the court, and includes therein 
no mention of a material allegation of fact 
raised at trial, such a party may be deemed to 
have waived any objection to the failure of 
the trial court to make such a finding. Such 
a waiver must be considered conclusive upon 
appeal. To rule otherwise would permit a 
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party tacitly to omit a material finding of 
fact from the proposed findings and then 
pursue reversal as a matter of law due to 
failure of the trial court to make such a 
finding." Id. at 935. 
If there is some factual allegation the Appellant claims has 
been omitted, the Appellant, who failed to include such a finding 
in the Findings of Fact that she drafted, is deemed to have waived 
any such objection. 
The next error is found in the statement that "importantly, 
Utah's Child Support Guidelines assume that the custodial parent is 
awarded the tax dependency exemption." Appellant's Brief at p. 23. 
While the statement is correct, the Appellant ignores that the 
action below was not a suit for divorce. This action was a 
modification. A modification requires a substantial change in 
circumstances. 
The Appellant's next error is in its invocation of Fullmer v. 
Fullmer, 761 P.2d 942 (Utah App. 1988). In Fullmer, the trial 
court had modified the Decree of Divorce so as to (1) switch 
custody of the parties' minor child from Mrs. to Mr. Fullmer, and 
(2) transfer the dependency exemption from Mrs. to Mr. Fullmer. On 
appeal, the Court first determined that the lower court erred in 
finding a change in circumstances upon which it based the 
modification of custody. The next question was whether Mr. 
Fullmer, who would then be the non-custodial parent, should still 
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be entitled to the dependency exemption. The Court in Fullmer 
determined that as under the IRS Code, the non-custodial parent 
could only claim the dependency exemption when the custodial parent 
signed a waiver, and as Mrs. Fullmer had not signed such a waiver 
and had not been ordered to sign a waiver, Mr. Fullmer could not 
claim the minor child. The reason Mrs. Fullmer was not ordered to 
sign a waiver to allow the non-custodial parent to receive the 
dependency exemption is that the lower court had made Mr. Fullmer 
the custodial parent. In a footnote found on page 24 of her brief, 
the Appellant asserts that the Decree of Divorce in the instant 
case did not order the Appellant to sign a waiver allowing the 
Appellee to claim the dependency exemption. In making this 
assertion, the Appellant hopes that this Court will ignore the 
final provision of the Decree of Divorce which states: 
"Each party is ordered to duly execute and deliver all documents 
necessary to effect the Decree of Divorce." As the IRS Code allows 
the non-custodial parent to claim the child as a dependency 
exemption when the custodial parent has signed a waiver, and as the 
Decree of Divorce grants the Appellee the dependency exemption from 
1990 forward, and as the Decree of Divorce orders the parties to 
sign whatever documents are necessary to carry out the terms of the 
Decree, the Appellant's Fullmer analysis is ill-founded. 
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Next, the Appellant states that 
"realistically, the custodial parent is often 
faced with expenses beyond those which are 
contemplated and calculated by the Guidelines 
on the basis of income alone." Appellant's 
Brief at p. 24. 
On page 27, the Appellant states: 
"Although Mr. Blaine's contribution to 
Alison's support is 76% of the Guideline 
total, this number alone cannot prove that Mr. 
Blaine provides a majority of the support for 
Alison." 
In making these statements, the Appellant is trying to 
convince the Court that despite the fact that pursuant to the 
Guidelines the Appellant is responsible for 24% of the combined 
child support, her actual percentage is greater than that, and 
therefore she deserves the dependency exemption. That may or may 
not be; the Appellant had the opportunity to produce such evidence 
at trial and failed to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellee respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
ruling of the lower court. 
DATED this ^OV/) day of /V/0/ // 1993. 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
ry Caston 
torneys for Appellee 
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ADDENDUM A 
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BRIAN M. BARNARD USB # 0215 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Defendant 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204 
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID BLAINE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PAMELA BRADSHAW (BLAINE) , 
Defendant. 
AMENDED 
FINDINGS OF FACT and 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 86-4900291 
(Hon. Anne Stirba) 
THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER having come before the court 
for trial on defendant's Petition to Modify, the Hon. Anne 
Stirba, judge presiding, the hearing being held on September 
3, 1992 at 9:30 a.m., plaintiff appearing in person and by 
and through counsel, Harry Caston, defendant appearing in 
person and by and through counsel, Brian M. Barnard, the 
parties having stipulated to the settlement of several 
issues, and then having submitted the remaining matters to 
the Court as legal issues, and the Court having on Friday, 
October 9, 1992 at 10:00 a.m. discussed with counsel the 
contents and terms of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
. ~ I r t c I:: -~J ared herein and having made some amendments 
thereto, based thereo^ ^ id fo^ : c,c,w£ cause appearing, the 
Court hereby makes and enters the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties were divorced in 1986 when plaintiff 
was a full time college student and his income was less than 
eight hundred dollars (<$800.00) per month. Defendant was 
employed full time as a teacher at that time. 
2. Since the divorce the plaintiff has completed his 
college education and is now employed full time by IBM in 
New York State earning three thousand eighty-one dollars 
($3,081.00) per month. 
3. Defendant currently earns one thousand sixty-five 
dollars ($1,065.00) per month working half time as a public 
school teacher. 
4. The child of the parties was three (3) years old 
when the divorce occurred and is now nine (9) years of age. 
The cost of caring for a nine year old child today is 
greater than for caring for a three year old child six years 
ago. 
5. The original decree entered May 2, 1986 provided 
that plaintiff would pay a maximum of two hundred and fifty 
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ADDENDUM B 
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BRIAN M. BARNARD USB # 0215 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204 
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID BLAINE, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. ! 
PAMELA BRADSHAW (BLAINE), : 
Defendant. : 
: FINDINGS OF FACT and 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 86-4900291 
(Hon. Anne Stirba) 
THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER having come before the court 
for trial on defendant's Petition to Modify, the Hon. Anne 
Stirba, judge presiding# the hearing being held on September 
3, 1992 at 9:30 a.m., plaintiff appearing in person and by 
and through counsel, Harry Caston, defendant appearing in 
person and by and through counsel, Brian M. Barnard, the 
parties having stipulated to the settlement of several 
issues, and then having submitted the remaining matters to 
the Court as legal issues, based thereon and for good cause 
appearing, the Court hereby makes and enters the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties were divorced in 1986 when plaintiff 
was a full time college student and his income was less than 
eight hundred dollars (<$800.00) per month. Defendant was 
employed full time as a teacher at that time. 
2. Since the divorce the plaintiff has completed his 
college education and is now employed full time by IBM in 
New York State earning three thousand eighty-one dollars 
($3,081.00) per month. 
3. Defendant currently earns one thousand sixty-five 
dollars ($1,065.00) per month working half time as a public 
school teacher. 
4. The child of the parties was three (3) years old 
when the divorce occurred and is now nine (9) years of age. 
The cost of caring for a nine year old child is substant-
ially greater than for caring for a three year old child. 
5. The original decree entered May 2, 1986 provided 
that plaintiff would pay a maximum of two hundred and fifty 
dollars ($250.00) per month in child support when his income 
exceeded one thousand two hundred and fifty dollars 
($1,250.00+) per month. The original decree had provisions 
for escalation of child support as plaintiff's income 
increased, but contained no provision for escalation after 
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plaintiffs income substantially exceeded one thousand two 
hundred and fifty dollars ($1,250.00) per month. 
6. The original decree provided that for the years 
1986 - 1989 inclusive the defendant could claim the child as 
a dependent and receive an exemption for income tax 
purposes. The original decree and existing order provided 
that for the year 1990 and each year thereafter the 
plaintiff could claim the child as a dependent and receive 
an exemption for income tax purposes. When the decree was 
entered the parties anticipated that in 1990 the plaintiff 
would be earning more than the defendant and that at that 
time he would have greater use for the dependency/exemption 
claim of the child. 
7. The original decree made no provision for life 
insurance on either parties' life for the benefit of the 
child. The parties stipulated and agreed that the decree 
should be modified to require each party to maintain life 
insurance coverage on their own life in the sum of at least 
one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00) naming the minor 
child as beneficiary during her minority naming the other 
party as trustee of those proceeds. 
8. Plaintiff was served with the petition for 
modification on April 22, 1991. 
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9. In April, 1991 plaintiff was earning only two 
thousand eight hundred fifty-two dollars ($2,852.00) gross 
monthly salary working for IBM. In April, 1991 defendant 
was earning one thousand eight hundred seventy-three dollars 
($1,873.00) gross per month working full-time as a school 
teacher. 
10. Under the statutory support guidelines, in April, 
1991, plaintiff's child support obligation to the defendant, 
if then re-calculated, would have been two hundred ninety-
five dollars ($295.00) per month. Said sum represents less 
than a twenty-five percent (<25%) increase in plaintiff's 
support obligation under the guidelines from the existing 
court order ($250.00) in effect in April 1991. 
11. On or about October 15, 1991, the plaintiff 
received an increase in his monthly gross income and since 
that date has been earning three thousand eighty-one dollars 
($3,081.00) gross per month. 
12. Plaintiff- has accumulated arrears ($2,350.00) in 
child support based upon his non-payment between August, 
1989 and December 1991 inclusive, of the full amount ($250.) 
as required by the decree. That amount ($2,350.00) should 
be off-set against the equitable lien ($2,217.00) plaintiff 
had against the former marital home of the parties. Thus, 
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there is a net balance due defendant from plaintiff for the 
sum of one hundred thirty-three dollars ($133.) representing 
the accumulated arrears less the equitable lien. The 
plaintiffs equitable lien should be extinguished. 
Plaintiff no longer has any claim or interest in the real 
property known as: 
Lots 1 and 2, Block 2, HOMESITE 
ADDITION, according to the official plat 
thereof, recorded in Bpok MF" of Plats 
at page 101 of the records of the Salt 
Lake County Recorder, State of Utah, 
located in Salt Lake County, Utah and commonly known as: 
555 East 2700 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106. 
Defendant should be granted a judgment against plaintiff in 
the sum of one hundred thirty-three ($133.00) dollars. With 
that judgment plaintiff's child support obligation through 
and including August, 1992 as provided for under the 
original decree has been satisfied. 
13. Defendant claimed in her Petition to Modify that 
there was a substantial change in circumstances which 
allowed the Court to reconsider and increase child support 
as well as to allow the court to re-consider and modify the 
decree with regard to which parent could claim the child as 
a dependent for income tax purposes. The parties agreed 
that there was a substantial change in circumstances which 
allowed the Court to reconsider and increase child support. 
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14. Other than the foregoing, defendant presented no 
evidence to show a change in circumstances of the parties or 
to justify increasing child support or altering the award of 
the tax dependency exemption allowance. 
15. The parties stipulated that all of the foregoing 
facts were true and correct for the purpose of settlement 
and for the purpose of presentation to the Court of various 
pending legal issues as raised by the pleadings on file. 
16. The defendant incurred court costs in the pursuit 
of her petition to modify. 
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING and for good cause appearing, 
the Court makes and enters the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The court has subject matter jurisdiction and 
personal jurisdiction over the parties. 
2. The plaintiff's child support obligation should be 
increased in light of a legally sufficient substantial 
change in circumstances set forth in the findings of fact. 
3. The substantial change in circumstances of the 
parties set forth above justifies modification of 
plaintiff's child support obligation. Under the statutory 
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guidelines based upon the parties7 current incomes and 
incomes as of October 15, 1991, plaintiff's child support 
obligation has increased by more than twenty-five per cent 
(>25%) over his obligation provided in the existing order. 
Pursuant to Ut. Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 (6) (1953 as amended) 
in light of that twenty-five percent (>25%) increase, the 
plaintiff's child support obligation should be increased to 
the sum of three hundred twenty-two dollars ($322.00) per 
month. 
4. The increased child support set forth in the 
foregoing paragraphs is in conformance with and is based 
upon the statutory guidelines, Ut. Code Ann. § 78-45-7.14 
(1953 as amended) . The sum of three hundred and twenty-two 
dollars ($322.00) per month is the exact amount provided 
under said guidelines. Under the guidelines said sum 
($322.00) represents seventy-six (76%) of the necessary 
support amount established by the guidelines based upon the 
combined incomes of the parties. 
5. Because the increase in plaintiff's salary to three 
thousand eighty-one dollars ($3,081.00) gross per month 
occurred on October 15, 1991, the increase in plaintiff's 
child support obligation should be retroactive, pursuant to 
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Ut. Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6 (2) (1953 as amended), only to 
October 15, 1991. 
6. The child support shall not be retroactive to when 
the plaintiff was served with the Petition for Modification 
(April 22, 1991) because as of that date based upon the 
parties' respective incomes at that time the increase in 
child support under the guidelines was less than one hundred 
twenty-five percent (<125%) of plaintiff's support 
obligation under the existing order. A substantial change 
of circumstances for the purpose of increasing child support 
does not occur unless there is an increase of at least 
twenty-five percent (25%) from the existing court ordered 
amount to the proposed new increased amount of support. Ut. 
Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 (6) (1953 as amended). Based upon the 
foregoing, the increase in child support should not be 
retroactive to April 22, 1991, but only to October 15, 1991. 
7. Plaintiff owes to defendant ten (10) months at 
$72.00 per month (November, 1991 - through August, 1992 
inclusive) plus $36.00 for one/half of the month of October, 
1991 for a total of seven hundred fifty-six dollars 
($756.00) as a result of the retroactive effect of the child 
support increase. Defendant should be granted a judgment 
for that amount against plaintiff. 
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8. There has not been a substantial change in circum-
stances of the parties sufficient to warrant altering the 
portion of the existing decree which awards to plaintiff the 
right to claim the minor child of the parties as a dependent 
and thus claim an exemption for income tax purposes. 
9. Under Motes v. Motes, 121 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 at 55, 
786 P.2d 239 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) and Allred v. Allred, 188 
Utah Adv. Rep. 47 (Utah Ct. App. June, 1992) a non-custodial 
parent is not required to pay support above the guideline 
amounts in order for the non-custodial parent to be awarded 
the right to claim a minor child as a dependent for income 
tax purposes. The holdings in those cases with regard to 
the award of the exemption/dependency allowance between 
parties apply to the award in the initial decree. When 
there is a change in the circumstances identified in Motes 
and Allredf there may be a modification of the Decree of 
Divorce with regard to award of the right to claim a child 
as a dependent for tax purposes. 
10. Based upon the stipulation of the parties, each 
party should be ordered to secure and maintain one hundred 
thousand dollars ($100,000.00) in life insurance on their 
respective lives, naming the minor child as the beneficiary 
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during her minority naming the other party as trustee of 
those proceeds. 
11. Plaintiff's accumulated arrears ($2,350.00) in 
child support should be off-set against the equitable lien 
($2,217.00) plaintiff has against the former marital home of 
the parties. Thus, there is a net balance due defendant 
from plaintiff for the sum of one hundred thirty-three 
dollars ($133.00) representing the difference between the 
accumulated arrears and plaintiff's equitable lien. 
Plaintiff's equitable lien should be extinguished. 
Plaintiff shall no longer have any lien, claim or interest 
in the real property known as: 
Lots 1 and 2, Block 2, HOMESITE ADD-
ITION, according to the official plat 
thereof, recorded in Book ,fFM, of Plats 
at page 101, records of the Salt Lake 
County Recorder, State of Utah, 
located in Salt Lake County, Utah and commonly known as: 
555 East 2700 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106. 
Defendant should be granted a judgment against plaintiff in 
the net sum of one hundred thirty-three ($133.00) dollars, 
thereupon plaintiff's child support obligation through and 
including August, 1992 as provided for under the original 
decree will be satisfied. 
12. Defendant is entitled to an award of her costs 
pursuant to Rule 54 (d)(1), Ut.R.Civ.Pro. 
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13. An order and judgment should be entered in 
conformance with the foregoing findings and conclusions. 
DATED this day of September, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO 
FORM & CONTENT: 
ANNE STIRBA 
JUDGE 
HARRY CASTON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a correct 
copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW to: 
HARRY CASTON 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
on the 15TH day of September, 1992, postage prepaid in the 
United States Postal Service. 
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